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THE CASE FOR A FEMINIST TORTS CASEBOOK 
CARL TOBIAS* 
Professor Leslie Bender's recent essay, An Overview of Feminist 
Torts Scho/,arship, 1 contributes substantially to the construction of 
feminist perspectives on tort law. She carefully and comprehen-
sively surveys burgeoning feminist scholarship in the field of 
torts. Professor Bender closely examines feminist histories of 
substantive tort law, the application of feminist theory to tort doc-
trine, to tort law concepts, and to the teaching of torts, tort issues 
that are important to women's lives, social science research in-
volving feminism and torts, book reviews that are relevant to fem-
inist tort law, and overviews of material that implicate feminist 
viewpoints of torts.2 After Professor Bender persuasively demon-
strates the breadth and depth of feminist scholarship in the torts 
area, she recognizes that considerable work remains to be under-
taken and concludes with a call for feminist torts scholars to re-
double their efforts. s 
Professor Bender specifically urges feminist legal theoreti-
cians to challenge the approach of conventional tort law to fault, 
legal responsibility, harm and causation, to translate .women's ex-
periences of injury into cognizable causes of action that will com-
pensate women, and to rethink traditional defenses to affirmative 
causes of action.4 Professor Bender correspondingly recom-
mends that feminist theoreticians challenge the organizational 
• Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Beth Brennan, 
Bari Burke and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and 
Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this piece, and the Harris Trust for gener-
ous, continuing support. Errors that remain are mine. 
1. Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 CORNELL L. 
REV. 575 (1993). 
2. See id. at 577-95. See generally Paul M. George & Susan McGlamery, Wo-
men and Legal Scholarship: A Bibliography, 77 IOWA L. REV. 87 (1991) (providing 
representative bibliography on women and legal scholarship); Symposium, Femi-
nist jurisprudence and Procedure, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1139 (1993) (providing ideas 
similar to those of Professor Bender regarding civil procedure). 
3. See Bender, supra note 1, at 595-96. Professor Bender is a prolific femi-
nist torts scholar. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and 
Tort, 38 J. LEGAL Eouc. 3 (1988) [hereinafter Primer]; Leslie Bender, Changing the 
Values in Tort Law, 25 TULSA LJ. 759 (1990). 
4. Bender, supra note 1, at 596. See generally Nancy S. Erickson, Final Report: 
"Sex Bias in the Teaching of Criminal Law," 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 309, 327-478 
(1990) (providing similar suggestions regarding criminal law). 
(1517) 
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structure of the torts field and tort law's values, create new para-
digms for treating personal injuries, analyze compensation 
schemes for evidence of systematic discrimination, and work to 
remedy or ameliorate the substantial human costs of physical and 
mental harm to individuals in society.5 She also suggests that 
practicing attorneys and torts scholars assess litigation strategies 
and develop alternatives to dispute resolution (ADR) that protect 
vulnerable people and facilitate the prompt disposition of per-
sonal injury lawsuits. 6 
Professor Bender recommends as well that feminist legal the-
orists reevaluate all of the tort doctrines and the discipline's ana-
lytical concepts to prevent their prejudices involving gender, 
class, race and sexuality from being unconsciously reproduced in 
the future. 7 She asserts that "law schools need torts casebooks 
with feminist perspectives, or, at a minimum, books that include 
feminist materials."8 I want to emphasize this insight as a spring-
board for providing a brief, friendly response that seeks to elabo-
rate upon Professor Bender's informative essay. 
Professor Bender is absolutely correct in urging that feminist 
legal theoreticians apply feminist "insights, methodologies, criti-
ques, and reconstructions" to all of the specific aspects of tort law 
that she exhaustively enumerates and to numerous additional fea-
tures of torts.9 The broad spectrum of doctrinal tort law is illus-
trative. Every substantive area and particular doctrine has its own 
history, theory, justification, practice, understanding and applica-
5. Bender, supra note 1, at 596. 
6. Id. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-478 (1993) (requiring federal district 
courts to experiment with ADR and other measures to facilitate prompt disposi-
tion of civil litigation); Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing 
the Risk of Prefudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359, 1375-
83 (warning of ADR's dangers for resource-poor individuals); Trina Grillo, The 
Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE LJ. 1545 (1991) (warn-
ing of ADR's dangers for women). 
7. Bender, supra note 1, at 596. See f!enerally Erickson, supra note 4, at 312-
20 (providing similar ideas regarding cnminal law); Judith Resnik, Revising the 
Canon: Feminist Help in Teachin~ Procedure, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181 (1993) (provid-
ing similar viewpoints as to avil procedure). 
8. Bender, supra note 1, at 596; see also infra note 27 and accompanying text. 
See generally Erickson, supra note 4, at 327-478 (criticizing criminal law casebooks 
from feminist perspective); Mary Joe Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analy-
sis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1065 (1985) (criticizing contracts 
casebook from feminist perspective); Carl Tobias, Gender Issues and the Prosser, 
Wade and Schwartz Torts Casebook, 18 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 495 (1988) (explor-
ing gender in torts casebook). 
9. Bender, supra note 1, at 575. See generally Elizabeth M. Schneider, Gender-
ing and Engendering Process, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1223 (1993) (providing similar 
ideas regarding civil procedure). 
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tion, each of which feminist reexamination, rethinking and re-
working could improve. 
The area of intentional torts warrants reconceptualization in 
light of new appreciation that modern intentional torts to persons 
frequently involve relationships, such as husband-wife or em-
ployer-employee, in which a male possesses disproportionate 
physical power or economic resources that he has used to the det-
riment of a woman. 10 These recent insights have supported the 
modification of longstanding tort law rules, such as interspousal 
immunity from liability for harm that a husband purposefully in-
flicts upon a wife. 11 The new understandings should concomi-
tantly be applied in recalibrating traditibnal intentional torts to 
encompass iajuries that employers deliberately perpetrate on em-
ployees in the workplace. 12 
Feminist legal theorists also could contribute substantially to 
a reassessment of the important doctrinal area of negligence. For 
example, Professor Bender has invoked feminist approaches in 
persuasively suggesting that the conventional notion of duty to 
rescue be fundamentally recast. 13 Constructing or rethinking the 
10. See, e.g., Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316, 316 (Tex. 1987} (involving 
claim by wife that husband's negligent driving caused wife's iajuries}; Hardy v. 
LaBelle's Distrib. Co., 661 P.2d 35, 36 (Mont. 1983} (involving false imprison-
ment claim by female employee against employer}. See generally Daniel Givelber, 
The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional In-
fliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 CoLUM. L. REV. 42, 65-75 
(1982} (discussing development of intentional infliction of emotional distress as 
tort to protect less powerful party in relationship}; Tobias, supra note 8, at 509-
19 (analyzing tort scenarios involving relationships in which women traditionally 
possessed less power}. 
11. See, e.g., Waite v. Waite, 618 So. 2d 1360, 1361(Fla.1993} (abrogating 
doctrine of interspousal immunity}; Bums v. Bums, 518 So. 2d 1205, 1209 
(Miss. 1988} (abandoning common-law concept of interspousal immunity}; see 
also Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. REV. 359, 359-61 
(1989} (analyzing interspousal immunity doctrine}. See generally Frances E. Ol-
sen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HAav. L. 
REV. 1497, 1530-38 (1983} (examining methods adopted to improve legal status 
of women within marital relationship}. 
12. See Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 615-16 (Md. 1977). See generally Re-
gina Austin, Emplo)'er Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1, 49-56 (1988} (espousing tort action of in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress as weapon for remedying employer 
abuse of employees); Givelber, supra note 10, at 62-75 (discussing lack of uni-
formity among courts as to specific elements required to assert claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress despite widespread recognition of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress as independent tort}. 
13. See Primer, supra note 3, at 33-36; see also Bender, supra note l, at 580-81 
(challenging "no duty to rescue" doctrine by means of alternative feminist con-
ceptions of human nature}. See generally Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic Man" Revis-
ited: Liberalism, Connection and Feminist jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171, 
1520 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38: p. 1517 
specific concept of the reasonable woman in the context of sexual 
harassment claims would correspondingly inform application of 
the general reasonable person standard in negligence law. 14 
When considering the ideas in this paragraph and the one imme-
diately above, it is important to remember that Professor Cathe-
rine MacKinnon has convincingly argued that sexual harassment 
should be treated as gender-based discrimination, rather than as a 
traditional tort. is 
Feminist legal thought also could improve theory and prac-
tice in the products liability area. For instance, several feminist 
tort scholars have observed that numerous products, such as the 
Dalkon Shield, diethytstilbestrol (DES), birth control pills, 
bendectin and breast implants, which have severely injured 
thousands of women, implicate women's reproduction. 16 In-
creased work on these issues might run in a number of directions. 
One critical question is why so many products that have seri-
ously hurt women involve their reproduction, the answer to which 
could reflect the gender of the individuals whom medical scien-
tists or society thinks should bear the risks of reproductive free-
dom or implicate the concomitant research that these scientists 
1228-42 (1992) (evaluating Professor Bender's proposal to recast "no duty to 
rescue" doctrine). 
14. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 877-79 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopt-
ing reasonable woman standard in sexual harassment civil actions); Andrews v. 
City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990) (concluding that sexual 
harassment must detrimentally affect reasonable person of same sex as victim); 
see also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993) (requiring plaintiff 
in Title VII sexual harassment claim to establish objectively hostile or abusive 
environment as well as subjective perception of abusive environment). See gener-
ally CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A 
CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979); Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and 
the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1197-220 (1989) 
(discussing problem of sexual harassment in workplace and proposing elements 
of more effective approach to challenging pervasiveness of male-centered 
norms); Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman 
Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398 (1992) (examining use 
of reasonable woman standard in context of sexual harassment). 
15. See MACKINNON, supra note 14, at 83-90, 158-61. 
16. See Tobias, supra note 8, at 500-01; see also Lucinda Finley, A Break in the 
Silence: Including Women '.s Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALE J .L. & FEMINISM 41, 66-69 
(1989) (discussing tort cases involving reproductive issues central to women's 
identities); Ellen Smith Pryor, Flawed Promises: A Critical Evaluation of the American 
Medical Association '.s Guides to the Evaluation of Pennanent Impairment, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 964, 970-73 (1990) (observing that injuries to females resulting in sexual 
impairment often have lower settlement value in workers compensation settle-
ment guide published by American Medical Association). See generally Leslie 
Bender, Feminist (Re) Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power and 
Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE LJ. 848 (criticizing legal system's over-reliance on 
economic, cost-based approach regarding mass tort litigation). 
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deem worthwhile. Another important issue is how to conceptual-
ize the regulation of products that may endanger women in ways 
that reduce the possibility of harm before it happens. For exam-
ple, feminist legal theorists could champion stricter regulation by 
calling for greater experimentation with medical devices prior to 
Food and Drug Administration approval. 
Feminist legal thinkers might correspondingly develop and 
suggest better methods of resolving disputes after products have 
hurt women. 17 For instance, additional analysis of mass tort liti-
gation involving the Dalkon Shield, DES, and breast implants18 
and of nationwide experimentation with techniques for expedit-
ing federal civil cases 19 may afford fairer and prompter means of 
treating these controversies. This evaluation could also yield im-
proved ways of resolving the lawsuits that are responsive to signif-
icant process values embedded in the litigation, such as enabling 
injured women to tell their stories in a public forum. 20 These re-
search efforts in the products liability field will probably show that 
current product regulation and extant doctrinal products law, 
much less proposals that would reinstitute negligence rather than 
strict liability,21 are insufficiently attentive to the needs of women. 
17. See Gina Kolata, Big Cases May End in Small Settlements, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
26, 1993, at E6; see also supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
18. See Linda S. Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed 
Federal Procedure Act, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1039, 1060·63 (1986). See generally SHELDON 
ENGELMAYER & ROBERT WAGMAN, LORD'S JUSTICE (1985) (analyzing Dalkon 
Shield litigation); RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAw: THE STORY OF THE 
DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY (1991) (examining Dalkon Shield litigation). 
19. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-478 (1988). See generally Linda S. Mullenix, The 
Counter-Reformation in Proceduraljustice, 77 MINN. L. REV. 375 (1992) (analyzing 
impact of Civil Justice Reform Act on federal judicial and legislative branches); 
Carl Tobias, Civil justice Refonn and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24 
ARIZ. ST. LJ. 1393 (1992) (arguing that Civil Justice Reform Act is threatening 
uniformity and simplicity of federal civil procedure). 
20. One important finding that Professor Lucinda Finley made when inter-
viewing DES daughters is the womens' concern that they be able to tell their 
stories in open court. Telephone Interview with Professor Lucinda Finley, 
SUNY Buffalo, School of Law (Feb. 3, 1993); see also Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the 
Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971, 987-95 (1991) (presenting legal images of 
battered women); Joyce McConnell, Incest as Conundrum: judicial Discourse on Pri-
vate Wrong and Public Hann, 1 TEX.J. WOMEN & L. 143, 172 (1992). See generally 
Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1466-71 
(1987) (book review) (discussing process values). 
21. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) and nearly all 
American jurisdictions now prescribe strict liability in torts for product liability. 
The Restatement (Third) of Torts, could modify this formulation. See James A. 
Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1513 (1992); see also Henry 
J. Reske, Experts Tackle Torts Restatement, 78 A.B.A. J. 18, 18 (1992) (noting that 
§ 402A may be subject to revision by American Law Institute). 
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The above ideas only illustrate the many areas of tort law in 
which considerable important work remains to be undertaken. In 
addition to opening debate and continuing dialogue across the 
entire doctrinal field of torts, we need to develop, refine, and 
more effectively link the history, theory and practice of tort law; to 
integrate and apply feminist legal thought and method; to incor-
porate feminist approaches across the curriculum, particularly in 
the first year courses, and throughout the law school environ-
ment; and to undertake much, much more. 
Illustrative of most of these phenomena are the Married Wo-
men's Property Acts, the history of which raises gender issues that 
faculty and students can productively explore in property, con-
tracts and civil procedure as well as torts. 22 The examination of 
this history also could promote integration of the first year curric-
ulum, combatting the tendency to view these substantive areas as 
discrete, compartmentalized units.23 The tort litigation process 
concomitantly provides valuable opportunities to consider wo-
men in the civil justice system as judges, lawyers, parties, wit-
nesses and jurors. 24 
In short, we must reexamine, rethink, reorganize, and recon-
ceptualize the field of tort law, essentially revolutionizing how we 
conceive of torts. A significant aspect of this worthy, if daunting, 
project is the need to unite the numerous disparate strands of tort 
law into a more coherent whole. Professor Bender has assembled 
and categorized a wealth of informative material that is important 
to feminist viewpoints of the tort area. We desperately need an 
efficacious means of organizing that sprawling discipline that is 
22. See, e.g., RICHARD H. CHUSED, CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS IN PROP-
ERTY 254-56, 266-67, 496-503 (1988) (exploring Acts in property); CHARLES L. 
KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAw: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 585-86 (3d ed. 1993) (exploring Acts in contracts). See generally NORMA 
BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAw: WOMEN, MARRIAGE AND PROPERTY IN NINE-
TEENTH CENTURY NEW YoRK (1982) (exploring married womens' acts and explor-
ing social and ideological conflict over appropriate role for married women in 
economic and political life of nation); Richard H. Chused, Married Womens' Prop-
erly Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. LJ. 1359 (1983) (examining development of mar-
ried womens' property acts). , 
23. See jay N. Feinman & Marc Feldman, Pedagogy and Politics, 73 GEO. LJ. 
875, 900-02 (1985). 
24. CJ. Barbara Allen Babcock, A Place in the Palladium: Womens Rights and 
jury Service, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1139, 1160-74 (1993) (providing similar ideas 
regarding womens' jury service); Resnik, supra note 7, at 1181-96 (providing 
similar ideas regarding civil procedure). See generally Judith Resnik, Naturally 
Without Gender: Women, jurisdiction and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682, 
1700-21 (1991) (discussing positions in federal court system potentially avail-
able to female candidates). 
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denominated torts. The overarching theory, the metatheory, if 
you will, already exists in the form of feminist legal thought. That 
theoretical construct must now be applied systematically to tort 
law. 
The instrument that is critical to this enterprise is readily 
available. That mechanism is the torts casebook, which can be 
beneficially employed to revise tort law and to attain other impor-
tant goals, such as infusing the study of torts with gender issues 
and feminist legal thought. The development and use of a femi-
nist casebook, therefore, could have felicitous effects beyond unit-
ing and clarifying the tort law field. 
The creation and employment of this casebook should illumi-
nate and emphasize gender issues throughout the torts course, 
requiring that fac.ulty and students seriously consider questions 
that might otherwise remain unexamined. The casebook may 
also afford a congenial context for implementing feminist 
pedagogy. For instance, these teaching materials, when used with 
other techniques, such as small group sessions, collaborative writ-
ing assignments and problem sets that include women, could fos-
ter a classroom learning environment in which female students 
feel more comfortable participating.25 The development of, and 
reliance on, a feminist casebook also may encourage more faculty 
and students to view gender issues and feminist approaches as 
institutionalized aspects of torts and of the broader law school 
curriculum and experience, thus increasing their legitimacy. 
We have instructive models, such as the monumental effort 
of Professor Henry Hart and Professor Herbert Wechsler, The 
Federal Courts and the Federal System, a casebook that substantially 
contributed to conceptualizing and elucidating the enormous, 
complex field of federal courts.26 Feminist torts theorists ought 
25. See Catherine Weiss & Lquise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Wo-
men, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1299, 1356-59 (1988); Stephanie M. Wildman, The Qµestion 
of Silence: Techniques to Ensure Full Class Participation, 38 J. LEGAL ED. 147 (1988); 
cf. Taunya Lovell Banks, Gender Bias in the Classroom, 38j. LEGAL ED. 137, 151-54 
(1988) (concluding that law professors must become more sensitive to language 
used and images conveyed in classroom). This treatment is obviously not in-
tended to exhaust the issue of womens' participation or the broader area of fem-
inist pedagogy. A number of the remaining articles in the symposium, Women in 
Legal Education - Pedagogy, Law, Theory and Practice, 38 j. LEGAL ED. 1 (1988), are 
applicable. See generally Feinman & Feldman, supra note 23 (proposing alternate 
approach to teaching basic courses in first year oflaw school). 
26. See HENRY M. HART, jR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1973); see also ARTHUR T. VoN MEHREN & DON-
ALD T. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS: CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON CONFLICTS OF LAws (1965) (analyzing multistate conflicts of law using tradi-
tional principles of legal analysis, which helped to organize field). 
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to draw on these exemplars in reconceiving torts. For instance, 
the scholars might initially formulate an effective organizational 
structure. They could then assemble and classify the scattered 
shards of tort law as constituents of the organic whole. The crea-
tion of this organizational framework also should facilitate the 
identification of gaps that require additional work and the 
designation of areas that warrant refinement. Once feminist theo-
reticians have completed these activities, they can begin integrat-
ing all of the pertinent information. 
The casebook is the linchpin for reconceptualizing and unit-
ing the sprawling field of tort law. Professor Bender has supplied 
many of the diverse threads. Quite significant to the development 
of a feminist torts casebook is Professor Jean Love's early effort to 
gather and organize relevant opinions and materials that could be 
employed in teaching torts from a feminist perspective.27 This 
work should be integral to the larger project that I contemplate. 
The expansion of Professor Love's endeavor, in conjunction with 
the collection, categorization and organization of the material 
that Professor Bender has reviewed, should provide the founda-
tion for constructing a more substantial edifice. 
Since Professor Bender published her essay, feminist legal 
scholars have agreed to undertake a project similar to the one 
that I am suggesting.28 Approximately twenty theoreticians have 
decided to develop a nontraditional torts casebook and have con-
tacted a major law book publisher about the prospect. The par-
ticipants are planning to depart in several important ways from 
the approaches that most existing casebooks in the field employ. 
The group will probably rely on a format that differs signifi-
cantly from conventional casebooks that emphasize the elements 
of affirmative causes of action and defenses for the major catego-
ries of intentional, negligent and strict liability torts. 29 The new 
materials would correspondingly include fewer appellate opin-
27 . . See Jean C. Love, Teaching Torts: A New Perspective - Selected Cases 
and Articles Oan. 1987) (unpublished mar\uscript) (copy on file with author); see 
also Bender, supra note 1, at 595 (suggesting feminist approach to teaching moral 
theory in context of tort law classes). A few casebooks include some feminist 
materials. See, e.g .• DAN B. DOBBS, TORTS AND COMPENSATION 398-400, 429 
(1993); HAROLD LUN"I"Z & DAVID HAMBLY, TORTS: CASES AND COMMENTARY (3d 
ed. 1992). But see Tobias, supra note 8 (criticizing treatment of women and gen-
der issues in widely used torts casebook). 
28. I rely substantially here on Telephone Interviews with Professor 
Phoebe Haddon, Temple University, School of Law (Nov. 5, 1993), and Profes-
sor Joan Vogel, Vermont Law School (Nov. 10, 1993). 
29. See DOBBS, supra note 27, at 21-712; WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 18-809 (8th ed. 1988). 
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ions and more secondary information, such as excerpts from law 
review articles and empirical data demonstrating, for instance, the 
high incidence of spousal rape.80 Moreover, the casebook may 
well incorporate numerous critiques, radical and otherwise, of 
traditional tort law and might even explore alternatives to con-
ventional notions of compensating injuries with monetary dam-
ages. 31 Finally, the authors are planning not only to apply 
feminist legal . theory and method to tort law, but also to stress 
issues important to torts that involve race, class, and sexual 
orientation. 32 
The feminist scholars have issued a call seeking additional 
expressions of interest, support and ideas. The group has held 
several preliminary meetings to implement an organizational 
structure and to discuss effective ways of proceeding. The partici-
pants have agreed on an initial organizational scheme. A few 
individuals will be on the "front-line" of organizing, conceptual-
izing, and writing, and the remainder will provide support by, for 
example, compiling relevant sources and reading background ma-
terial. The comparatively mundane tasks of allocating responsi-
bilities for planning the project have not been particularly 
controversial. 
Additional aspects of the undertaking have sparked lively in-
tellectual debate and healthy exchange among the participants. 
Illustrative have been the discussions of the appropriate balance 
between the theoretical and practical treatment of tort law with 
some scholars preferring a more abstract approach and others ad-
vocating a comparatively pragmatic examination. The group 
members have apparently disagreed, and may continue to differ, 
over fundamentals, such as format, coverage, and how dramati-
cally to depart from traditional presentations of tort law. Indeed, 
one of the most challenging features of the project may be trans-
lating the extraordinary promise of feminist legal thought into the 
reality of a feminist torts casebook. 
The new effort to create the casebook is invaluable, and all 
30. See Maria L. Marcus, Conjugal Violence: The Law of Force and the Force of 
Law, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1657 (1981); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights 
and Politics: Perspectives from the Womens Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 642-48 
(1986). 
31. See Richard L. Abel, Torts, in THE POLITICS OF LAw 326-49 (rev. ed. 
1990); Morton J. Horwitz, The Doctrine Of" Objective Causation, in id. at 360-86; see 
also Bender, supra note l, at 584-86 (discussing alternative tort remedies for inju-
ries suffered by women). 
32. The material in this paragraph is very tentative and is primarily pre-
mised on the conversation with Professor Vogel, supra note 28. 
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legal educators interested in feminist legal theory and practice 
should do everything possible to ensure its successful completion. 
This worthy endeavor and my suggestions may be incomplete, 
and both could encounter obstacles, experience missteps or lead 
to errors. The need for a feminist torts casebook, the possibility 
of better comprehending the field, and the benefits of integrating 
feminist legal thought into torts that the effort represents, how-
ever, are too great to delay any longer the attempt. 
